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Abstract
The idea of architectures of control is introduced through examples ranging from urban
planning to digital rights management, and the intentions behind their use in consumer
products are examined, with reference to case studies of printer cartridges and proposed
‘optimum lifetime products.’ The reactions of the technical community and consumers
themselves are also explored, along with some wider implications.
Introduction
Architectures of control are features, structures or methods of operation designed into
physical products, software, buildings, city layouts—or indeed any planned system
with which a user interacts—which are intended to enforce, reinforce, or restrict certain
modes of user behaviour.
Whilst the use of architectures of control in computing is well-known, and a
current issue of much debate (in terms of digital rights management, ‘trusted’ computing
and network infrastructures themselves), it is apparent that technology is also offering
increased opportunities for such architectures to be designed into a wide range of
consumer products; yet, this trend has not been commonly recognised.
This paper examines some of these applications, the intentions behind them,
wider consequences and future uses of architectures of control. The assumption is made
that products and systems can be engineered and designed with rationales and
intentions behind them beyond the prima facie functionality or appearance
requirements of a conventional specification or brief.
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First, it is worth looking at the broad range of architectures of control both inside and
outside of product design. The use of the term ‘architecture’ is no coincidence, since it is
in the planned systems which people inhabit—buildings and environments—that the
idea of shaping behaviour is consistently evident.
On a small scale: the high windows of traditional British school classrooms might
be positioned in the optimum location for lighting (on the ‘left’ to illuminate the work of
right-handed pupils—an ‘accessibility’ debate in itself), but the sills are almost always
high enough to prevent pupils’ being distracted by events outside. This is a simple
architecture of control.
Urban planning
On a grander scale: the designs of urban planners such as Baron Georges-Eugène
Haussmann [1,2], who remodelled Paris for Louis Napoléon (later Napoléon III) after
1848, may include elements of physical crowd control (replacing many narrow
streets—which had made the revolutionaries’ barricades effective—with broad
boulevards and avenues [1]) and, less obviously, psychological crowd control (a mob may
feel less powerful if positioned in the middle of a large area, whether that be a park or a
thoroughfare).
Despite Jane Jacobs’ wise warnings in The Death and Life of Great American
Cities against generalising about the value of “More Open Space” in city planning [3], as
part of an architecture of control it becomes just another tool in the strategic toolbox.
Indeed, strategic design may be something of a synonym for the use of architectures of
control, not just in ‘political’ city planning—which will be considered further
later—but across the range of human endeavour where some particular user behaviour is
desired or required.
Extending the review into other aspects of the built environment, features as
diverse as ‘traffic calming’ (speed humps, built-out kerbs and chicanes as physical
controls, removal of road centre-lines as psychological controls [e.g. 4]), the increasing
use of ‘pig ears’ on walls and radiused kerbs as deterrents to skateboarders [5], and even
park benches with central armrests [e.g. 6] to prevent people sleeping on them (or
indeed, ‘perches’ at bus-stops and deliberately uncomfortable café chairs to discourage
lingering), all fall into the category of architectures of control.
2 2Disciplinary architecture
At this point, the discussion could well move into how what is characterised as
‘defensive architecture’ is in fact ‘disciplinary architecture’; as Ocean Howell of San
Francisco State University notes [5], it is ‘defending’ the general public against
‘undesirable’ behaviour by other members of the public.
This is only one step away from Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon [7] and Michel
Foucault’s argument (in Discipline and Punish [8]) that by embedding punishment
systems in architecture and institutions (e.g. prisons) rather than meting out direct
retribution publicly (e.g. public execution or floggings), the likelihood of adverse public
reaction to the punishment is greatly reduced. In the park bench example, a public
confrontation between police and a person sleeping on the bench (with possible
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Academic precedents: artefacts and politics
Many academic fields touch on areas relevant to this subject, from architecture to computer science.
Perhaps the closest single exposition of many of the pertinent concepts is Langdon Winner’s 1986 “Do
artifacts* have politics?” in which he discusses the idea that:
Winner uses examples to show both intended strategic architectures of control, and technologies
which have had an unintended political or social effect (but which are not architectures of control).
The former category, relevant to this subject, includes Baron Haussmann’s ‘new’ Paris (q.v.) and much
of Robert Moses’ urban planning in NewYork City—most notably the low bridges on Long Island
parkways to prevent buses (more likely to have poorer users) from travelling to areas such as Jones
Beach, “Moses’ widely acclaimed public park”:
Concluding by exhorting us to “achieve a clearer view” of the interactions between technology and
society, and to consider and understand more fully the consequences of how “specific features in the
design or arrangement of a device or system could provide a convenient means of establishing
patterns of power and authority in a given setting,” Winner’s work was extremely prescient and the
implications are even clearer today.
*I have retained the US spelling for this title
“The machines, structures, and systems of modern
material culture can be accurately judged not only
for their contributions to efficiency and
productivity and their positive and negative
environmental side effects, but also for the ways in
which they can embody specific forms of power and
authority” [1]
“Many of his monumental structures of concrete and
steel embody a systematic social inequality, a way of
engineering relationships among people that, after a
time, became just another part of the landscape” [1].
>sympathy from bystanders) can be avoided entirely by preventing anyone sleeping on
the bench in the first place (using the architecture to control). Not for nothing are speed
humps commonly known as ‘sleeping policemen’ in the UK.
Nevertheless, whilst fascinating, it is perhaps counterproductive to go too deep
into this vein, since within the context of product design, it is clear that many of the
objectives of Foucault’s “technologies of punishment” can be achieved, and even
surpassed, through architectures of control—surpassed in the sense that people can be
prevented from committing the crimes in the first place.
A breathalyser interlock on a car ignition can stop the crime occurring, thus
there is no need for punishment. The necessary discipline is forced on the user by the
product architecture. Bentham’s Panopticon guard need not sit in the centre any more to
achieve optimum surveillance. He or she could be replaced by a computer monitoring
the behaviour of every inmate—or indeed, preventing infractions in the first place, as
far as possible.
As another product example of disciplinary monitoring, the Traksure black-box
monitoring system for ‘young male drivers,’ offered by AXA Insurance in Ireland [9],
records and transmits (via GSM) the car’s speed and location, in return for a discount on
the premium for ‘safe’ drivers; a similar system is on offer in the UK, but focused on
enforcing a mileage-based insurance policy [10].
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Academic precedents: what things regulate
“Four constraints regulate this
pathetic dot—the law, social norms,
the market, and architecture—and the
‘regulation’ of this dot is the sum of
these four constraints... The
constraints are distinct, yet they are
plainly interdependent. Each can
support or oppose the others.
Technologies can undermine norms and
laws; they can also support them
[emphasis added]” [50].
Lawrence Lessig, currently of Stanford Law
School, has been at the forefront of much recent
and current debate on intellectual property and
how the internet is constructed and regulated.
His books, Code, and Other Laws of Cyberspace
[29], The Future of Ideas [51] and more recently
Free Culture [26] have established the issues of
online freedom, the Creative Commons and the
digital rights debate within an academic
framework.
Specifically relevant to this paper is
Lessig’s chapter, ‘What things regulate,’ in
Code, and Other Laws of Cyberspace, in which
the idea is introduced of four constraints, or
‘regulators’ on an individual, or an activity or
behaviour:
In a sense, this paper is investigating how the ‘architecture’ regulator can be (and is being)
extended—through the incorporation of architectures of control into products—so that its scope
encompasses the aims of the market (commercial benefit) and possibly the law (disciplinary
architecture) and social norms (social benefit), although the mapping is clearly not exactly one-to-
one:
Lessig’s architecture is applied to the internet in terms of the software that governs the way people
and machines can interact; his argument is that governments (or companies) have a range of methods
beyond the law itself through which they can regulate consumers’ behaviour, and that the public
should wake up to this. This paper aims to demonstrate some manifestations of that regulation in the
context of product design.
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The design field where architectures of control have become most firmly established is
software; to a large extent any application which affords the user a limited range of
behaviours is, by definition, an architecture of control.
This may seem obvious, but it is not a trivial statement to make: a system which
uses a limited set of algorithms to determine how it functions is different to our
experience of the ‘real’ world, in which the rules also exist but are (mostly) too complex
for us to analyse deterministically. However, it may be argued that the architectures of
control are what gives the software its function in the first place, so it is more useful
here to look at the ‘next level up’ of control in software—architectures of control with
strategic intentions of some kind.
Digital rights management
Digital rights management (DRM) can encompass a variety of architectures of
control—in the words of Andreas Bovens, “in essence, every use that is not specifically
permitted by the content [or hardware] provider is in fact prohibited” [11].
This situation, whilst it has legal precedents in the idea of explicitly enumerated
lists of rights (as opposed to a more evolutionary common law approach), has never
before been applicable to products. The implications of this level of control for
unanticipated ‘freedom to tinker’ innovation cannot yet be fully appreciated, but, as will
be examined later, could be significant.
One factor driving DRM’s adoption is that digital electronics permits (indeed,
relies upon) exact copies of information being made at low or zero marginal costs. Thus
if the information vendors (who may or may not be the rights-holders) wish to maintain
their revenues or restrict the availability of information, technology needs to be
embedded in the architecture of the information, or copying device, or both, which
controls or restricts that ability to copy. DRM allows the balance of control to be shifted
from the user (e.g. “Who’ll know if I photocopy a book in the library rather than buying
a copy?”) to the content or hardware provider (e.g. “We’ll build a photocopier that will
refuse to copy the book in the first place”). Similarly, then, to the ‘disciplinary
architecture’ outlined in the built environment context, DRM, both as copy-prevention
and for other purposes, can be used to prevent legal infractions.
However, it can equally be used to prevent behaviours which are by no means
illegal, but which the DRM controller desires to prevent for its own strategic reasons—
6 6in some cases, infringing established rights on the part of the consumer. For example, in
most legislatures, it is accepted that a backup copy may be made of software, audio or
video purchased by the consumer; yet DRM can prevent this ‘fair use’ copying with
impunity [12]. Equally, there is the right of a customer to re-sell an item he or she has
purchased; this, too can be restricted using DRM, to the extent that, say, software could
not be installed on a subsequent purchaser’s machine, even if it had been uninstalled
from the original—to what extent this affects the statutory property rights of the
purchaser will be an area of increased debate as DRM becomes more prevalent.
There is increasing potential for DRM to provide the architectures of control to
enforce the (often very restrictive) end-user licence agreements (EULAs) for software;
whilst it is likely [13] that many users do not fully abide by the EULAs to which they
currently ‘agree,’ architectures of control embedded in both software and hardware
could greatly reduce the possibilities for deviance.
Another implication of some DRM architectures is the control of user access:
certain users could be prevented from viewing information or using functions (trivial
strategic hardware analogues might be keeping certain items on high shelves to prevent
children reaching them, or ‘child-proof’ lids on medicine bottles).
The discrimination could well be purely for security reasons (just as the first
encryption of a message was, in itself, an architecture of control), but when a
combination of economic and political motivations comes into play, the dystopian
science-fiction vision presented back in 1997 in Richard Stallman’s “The Right to Read”
does not appear especially exaggerated:
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“In his software class, Dan had learned that
each [electronic] book had a copyright
monitor that reported when and where it
was read, and by whom, to Central
Licensing. (They used this information to
catch reading pirates, but also to sell
personal interest profiles to retailers.) The
next time his computer was networked,
Central Licensing would find out.” [14]Trusted computing
Indeed, as the quote shows, Stallman also anticipated the rise of ‘trusted computing,’ in
the sense of a computer which will report on its owner’s behaviour and—perhaps more
importantly—is built with the ability for a third party, such as Microsoft, or a
government agency (“absentees with clout” in Stallman’s phrase) to control it remotely.
Of course, any attempt by the user to prevent this would be automatically reported, as
would any attempts to tinker with or modify the hardware.
There is insufficient space here to explore the full range of architectures of
control which trusted computing permits, but the most notable example identified by
Cambridge’s Ross Anderson [15] is automatic document destruction across a whole
network, which could remove incriminating material, or even be used to ‘unpublish’
particular authors or information (shades of Fahrenheit 451). Users who are identified as
violators could be blacklisted from using the network of trusted computers, and anyone
who is recorded to be contacting or have contacted blacklisted users would
automatically be put under some suspicion.
Within organisations (corporate and governmental), as Anderson points out,
these architectures of control could be very useful security features—indeed, perhaps
the salient features which spur widespread adoption of trusted computing. Confidential
documents could be kept confidential with much less fear of leakage; documents could
be prevented from being printed (as some levels of Adobe PDF security already permit
[16, 26]); and those who have printed out restricted information (whether they be
correspondence, CAD data, or minutes of meetings) would be recorded as such. Sensitive
data could ‘expire,’ just as Flexplay’s DVDs [17] self-destruct 48 hours after they are
removed from the package (another product architecture of control).
The impact of data expiry on long-term archiving and Freedom of Information
legislation, where internal government communications are concerned, is as yet unclear
[18]; equally, the treatment of works which are legally in the public domain, yet fall
under the control of access restrictions (the Adobe Alice in Wonderland eBook débâcle
[e.g. 19, 27] being a DRM example) is a potential area of conflict. It is possible that
certain works will never practically fall into the public domain, even though their legal
copyright period has expired, simply because of the architectures of control which
restrict how they can be used or distributed.
The wider implications of trusted computing architectures of control are
numerous—including a significant impact on product design as so many consumer
8 8products now run software of one form or another. The network effects of, for example,
only being able to open files that have been created ‘within’ the trusted network will
work heavily against non-proprietary and open-source formats. Those outside of the
‘club’ may be under great pressure to join; a wider move towards a two-tier
technological society (with those who wish to tinker, or have to, from economic or other
necessity, being very much sidelined by the ‘consensus’ of ‘trusted’ products and users)
is possible.
The analogue hole
The ‘analogue hole’ is another issue which architectures of control in both products and
software aim to address. In simple terms, this is the idea that however sophisticated the
DRM copy prevention system is on, say, a music CD, the data still have to be converted
into an analogue form (sound) for humans to hear. So, if one can capture that sound and
re-digitise it (or store it in an analogue form), a near-perfect copy can be made,
circumventing any copy-prevention measures. Indeed, digital-to-analogue-to-digital
conversion (as used in most modems) has also been used for some innovative reverse
engineering, such as extracting the iPod’s firmware as a series of clicks in order to aid
the iPodLinux project [20]. With such uses, it is perhaps no wonder that analogue-to-
digital converter ICs themselves (ADCs) are considered as “endangered gizmos” by the
Electronic Frontier Foundation [21].
Architectures of control to plug the analogue hole could include products which
refuse to record any input unless a verified authorisation signature is detected in the
signal, or a product which deliberately degrades anything recorded using it (or only
provides degraded output for connection to another device). Indeed, a ‘Broadcast Flag’
or equivalent [22], embedded in the signal or content, could explicitly list characteristics
of any recording made, such as quality degradation, prevention of advertisement
skipping, or number of subsequent copies that can be made.
Extending this idea, cameras and camcorders could detect the presence of
copyrighted, trademarked or DRM’d material in an image or broadcast and refuse to
record it, thus preventing the use of camcorders in cinemas—but also, perhaps,
preventing your hobby of photographing company logos, or, as Cory Doctorow points
out, “[refusing] to store your child’s first steps because he is taking them within eyeshot
of a television playing a copyrighted cartoon” [23]. A possible extension of this would
be cameras or camcorders which would automatically censor certain images for reasons
other than copyright—for example, censoring significant areas of flesh.
9 9The issue of the proposed Broadcast Flag [22]—still not resolved at time of writing [e.g.
24]—is another in a series of attempts by economic interests to lobby legislators to
incorporate support for architectures of control into law.
The major example in this field is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (and its
worldwide equivalents), which prohibits the development or distribution of technology
intended to avoid copy prevention measures [25]; whether this is a genuine attempt to
promote creativity through protecting copyright, or just rent-seeking, has been the
subject of an enormous amount of debate over the past few years [e.g. 28]. The precedent
set with DVD region-coding, for example, suggests that commercial benefit is the only
motive of much work in this field, with no benefits for the consumer.
Other digital architectures of control
The architectures of computer networks themselves can, of course, be an important
method of controlling user behaviour (and, along with other network architectures, have
been studied extensively-as discussed in ‘Academic precedents: control and networks’).
Without going into too much detail here, it is clear that much of the growth of the
Internet can be put down to very loose, yet still functional, architectures of control, or
code, as Lawrence Lessig (q.v.) puts it [29]. Anyone is free to write software and
distribute it, publish information or ideas, transfer files, contact other users, or interact
with and use data in different ways.
Architectures that introduce a more restrictive, prescriptive (and proscriptive)
network structure may have benefits for security in online commerce and certainly offer
governments a strategic tool for more effective control and censorship. As more and
more consumer products operate as part of networks (from computers themselves to
mobile phones and even toys), the potential for the network structure to be a significant
architecture of control also increases.
Finally, the idea of captology [30], or “computers as persuasive
technology”—using features inherent to computer-based systems to persuade users to
modify their behaviour (for example, giving up smoking, or increasing motivation to
exercise)—is a growing area in itself, and whilst captology always intends to persuade
rather than coerce or force, the thinking has much in common with strategic design and
architectures of control. Captology is examined further in ‘Academic precedents:
everyday things and persuasive technology.’
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Academic precedents: control and networks
“...helps explain the push in the
telecommunications industry for new
network architectures that would
provide service providers greater
control of what customers do, and
would deviate from the ‘stupid
network’ model of the Internet.” [60]
To some extent, the desire of companies to
control what consumers do with their products
has parallels with attempts at price
discrimination in industries such as freight
transportation, and, especially,
telecommunications.
Andrew Odlyzko of the University of
Minnesota’s Digital Technology Center points
out that telecommunications companies are
currently able to achieve revenues of $3,000 per
megabyte of data sent through SMS, yet the
same data sent through cable TV would yield
only $0.00012 per megabyte [60]. The
internet—where, effectively, all data are priced
the same—lacks these architectures of control,
and this:
Regulation and control of users’ behaviour in
other telecommunications networks can also be
a commercial necessity, especially where
bandwidth is considered to be at a
premium—for example, wireless grids,
“challenging environments in which users’
strategic behaviours are crucial to system
performance.” [61]
Lee McKnight, William Lehr and James
Howison have reviewed technical, social, legal
and economic methods to regulate behaviour in
wireless grids (paralleling Lessig's four
regulators, q.v.), with the technical methods
most closely corresponding to architectures of
control as examined here—as they put it:
On a similar issue, ‘internet appliances’—the
hardware through which a user (or a device)
connects to the internet for a dedicated
“particularity of purpose”—come into the
picture as products for enacting architectures of
control on behalf of telecommunications
companies or ISPs: since the architecture of the
internet itself is difficult to change, control may
be put into the components which face the
user.
Sharon Gillett, John Wroclawski, David
Clark and William Lehr again (all MIT) have
examined a range of internet appliances, the
architectures of control built into them, and
threat posed to “internet innovation” by the
devices; their conclusion is that because of the
enormous number of existing PCs, largely free
of restrictive control, connected to the internet,
any new, restrictive device will be at an
immediate disadvantage—even if simply
because users will be dissatisfied by these
devices’ lack of forwards compatibility:
“Appropriate behaviour can be ‘hard-
wired’ into the network through
hardware and software design... The
key is to define open interfaces that
provide sufficient assurance as to the
functionality that will be supported to
allow interoperability without
dictating detailed implementation
rules that might limit innovation.” [61]
“Truly fixed function appliances... are
unlikely to place a serious drag on
innovation, because they are only
likely to succeed in the marketplace if
they are inexpensive, frequently
replaced devices [e.g. phones]” [62].
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Nevertheless, they accept that devices where the function can be remotely changed through
automated software updates (such as the TiVo) are more of a risk—but note consumers’ lack of
enthusiasm:
Although not expressly considered by Gillett et al, trusted computing would seem to fall squarely into
this category, and, assuming that the majority of existing PCs are ultimately replaced by ‘trusted’
computers, the threat suddenly gains considerable momentum.
“Consumers do seem to be quite aware of, and
unenthused by, the extent to which high switching
costs would lock them into particular devices and
services. This kind of lock-in may be a policy issue
in its own right, especially if coupled with other
products, services, or practices that raise antitrust
concerns” [62].The range of architectures of control: simple control in products
Whilst architectures of control in digital systems can be complex, there are many very
simple control architectures in products which are either self-evident, or become so once
the design intention is explained.
Restriction of access
Some of the most obvious involve attempts to restrict access of certain users. At a very
basic level, locks and the keys that go with them (whether physical keys, or passwords,
or PINs, or biometric identification systems) are architectures of control. But it is child-
proof lids on medicine bottles, placing things ‘out of reach of little hands’ and child
locks on car doors with which we are most familiar.
Equally, adult users may have their access restricted to particular components for
safety reasons, although denying access in this way is often done for economic reasons
—a recent example being the bonnet of the Audi A2 which is not intended to be opened
by the car’s owner, but only by an authorised Audi dealer. It is presented as a
‘convenience’ feature—and some owners undoubtedly see it this way, for example this
quote from an online review:
The implications of restricting the ‘freedom to tinker’ (and even the ‘freedom to
understand’) in this way will be examined in the ‘Reactions’ section later, but where the
economic motive behind an architecture of control is more baldly obvious, such as
Hewlett-Packard’s printer cartridge expiry (see ‘Case Study: Printer Cartridges’), some
consumer backlash has already started. Nevertheless, there is nothing unusual about
economic lock-in; even when purchasing replacement parts for products where only the
‘genuine’ parts will fit (or where non-genuine parts will invalidate a warranty), from
razor blades to batteries, we are consistently subject to it, reinforced by branding.
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“You cannot open the bonnet—correct—a
specialist has to open it for you—now I don’t
know if some of you will think this a
disadvantage, but I certainly didn’t! To access
the water and oil supply, just flick a switch
inside the car, and the Audi logo at the front of
the vehicle flips open. There you will have
access to fill up water and oil—clever stuff!” [31]Forcing functions
On a different note, many architectures of control in products are what Donald Norman
calls ‘forcing functions’ (see ‘Academic precedents: everyday things and persuasive
technology’)—“actions are constrained so that failure at one stage prevents the next step
from happening” [32]. A common way of achieving this is an ‘interlock,’ which could be
an aid to usability—to increase the likelihood that the product is operated in the correct
order (for example, Steve Portigal suggests a card payphone where the card slot is
underneath the handset, thus ensuring the handset is lifted before the card is swiped
[33]).
Equally, interlocks can be used for more strategic disciplinary functions—
preventing illegal acts by the user, such as a breathalyser fitted to a car’s ignition system
such that only when the test is ‘passed’ can the car be started. There are variants of this,
e.g. the ‘Simple Simon’ memory game using coloured lights, used on the MG/British
Leyland SSV1 ‘safety car’ prototype in the 1970s, which would also deal with overly
tired or drugged drivers:
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Two precedents from the interface between
design, business and psychology are especially
relevant here.
First, Donald Norman’s influential The
Psychology of Everyday Things, later republished
as The Design of Everyday Things [32], formalised
and analysed much of the accumulated wisdom
surrounding user behaviour and interaction
with products—taking ‘human factors’ design
beyond ergonomics and anthropometrics and
into the field of usability: considering users’
conceptual models and
“Get the (randomly generated) sequence wrong
three times in a row, and [the driver] would have
to wait an hour before being allowed to try again.
While designed primarily as a safety device, this
feature also doubled as pretty effective
immobiliser.” [34] >
Academic precedents: everyday things and persuasive technology
mental processes, with the aim of improving
the customer experience (and, with it, making
products more competitive in the market-
place).
Norman’s clear explanation of forcing
functions—he uses the seatbelt interlock as an
example—with the classification into
interlocks, lock-ins and lock-outs, is useful as a
framework for understanding many
architectures of control. He also sounds the
appropriate notes of caution for designers
considering the use of forcing functions:
>
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The other major precedent at this design-business-psychology interface is the work of B J Fogg and
his team at Stanford’s Persuasive Technology Laboratory [52] into ‘captology’—computers as
persuasive technology. Whilst much of the work is concerned explicitly with computer-based
persuasion (websites, games and interactive software), the extension of software into products,
particularly mobile devices is also a component of the research.
Fogg is explicit about the distinction between persuasion and coercion (and deception);
many (indeed most) of the architectures of control outlined in this paper would undoubtedly be
classed as coercive technology rather than persuasive technology by his definition.
For example, taking two products which have a common possible outcome (reducing the
amount of hours for which children watch television), Square-Eyes (q.v.) is probably on the coercion
side of the boundary, whilst the AlternaTV system mentioned in Fogg’s book Persuasive Technology
[53] is on the persuasion side, since it does not actually restrict children, merely encourage them
through, effectively, a competition to see which ‘team’ can watch the least television.
Nevertheless, many of the points that Fogg raises are pertinent when the issue of
consumers’ reactions to architectures of control is raised. From Persuasive Technology:
Considering the ethics of the intentions behind persuasive technologies is a central part of captology
research; the most favoured examples are those with intended social benefit, and whilst commercial
benefit is not decried (especially where it is also helpful to the consumer), subversive uses of
persuasive technology for commercial benefit are criticised—for example, Hewlett-Packard’s
complex ‘MOPy Fish’ screensaver (which encouraged users to print multiple copies of documents, as
“If a forcing function is really desired, it is usually possible
to find one, although at some cost for normal behaviour. It is
important to think through the implications of that cost—to
decide whether people will deliberately disable the forcing
function... It isn’t easy to force unwanted behaviour onto
people. And if you are going to use a forcing function, make
sure it works right, is reliable, and distinguishes legitimate
violations from illegitimate ones” [32].
>
“Interactions created for mobile devices should support an
intensive, positive relationship between user and product.
Otherwise, the relationship is likely to be terminated, as the
device becomes ‘a goner.’ If you viewed a mobile device as
part of you, you would expect it to serve you; serving
someone else would be a type of betrayal—your device sold
you out” [54].Another commonly cited forcing function for a car ignition is a seat-belt
interlock—championed by Lee Iacocca in the 1970’s, and briefly made mandatory on
new cars in the United States, but deeply unpopular [32, 35]. “In response to public
pressure, Congress took about twenty minutes to outlaw Interlock. They replaced it with
an eight-second buzzer that would remind passengers to buckle up” [35].
Whilst there are ways to defeat the interlock on these examples, e.g. “many
people kept their seat-belts buckled—but without wearing them” [35], depending on
how the architectures of control are designed into products, the amount of effort
required to overcome them may be too great for most users, even if there are cost or
convenience benefits. Apathy, and a fear of ‘meddling’ with devices which may have
been an expensive outlay in the first place, may in themselves be significant
architectures of control.
Related to interlocks are ‘lock-ins’ (in a different sense to the economic usage
mentioned above) and lock-outs. In this sense a lock-in is a forcing function which
prevents (or delays) a user from stopping an operation or action which is deemed
important. In product terms, an example might involve certain buttons or keys being
temporarily disabled, perhaps where accidentally pressing them would be detrimental.
Norman suggested, in 1988, the idea of ‘soft’ off switches for computers, which
permit files and settings to be saved before allowing the power to be cut [32], and indeed
such soft power switches are now the norm. In terms of control, this can be either useful
to the consumer, or an irritation (in cases where a quick power-down is required), but
it’s difficult to see it as a strategic architecture of control. Lock-ins with strategic
intentions include ‘nag’ screens on software which require the user to wait a certain
amount of time before clicking ‘OK’ (i.e. exiting the current ‘operation’) in the hope that
a promotional message will be read (or that the irritation will become sufficient that the
user registers, or pays for, the product [36]). In some cases, this type of lock-in is used to
increase (marginally) the likelihood that an EULA will be read, by requiring that the
user at least scroll to the bottom before proceeding.
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an alternative to photocopying, in return for ‘points’ which would allow the user to ‘buy’ items to
enhance the fish’s habitat) [55].
Fogg notes that, “in the future, certain interactive influence tactics are likely to raise ethical
concerns, if not public outrage” [56], and, as applied to architectures of control in general, this may
well be a significant understatement.
>Lock-outs are perhaps more obviously ‘architectures of control’—the aim being to
prevent undesirable behaviour or events from occurring. A good example given by
Norman is a barrier on a staircase to prevent people, in a panic (e.g. in the event of a
fire), accidentally running downstairs past the ground floor and into a basement [32].
Mistake-proofing
To a large extent, forcing functions as architectures of control have been inherent in
product design and engineering for many decades without necessarily being explicitly
recognised as such.
The idea of mistake-proofing, (poka-yoke in Shigeo Shingo’s system, as applied at
Toyota and other Japanese firms [37]), whilst by no means identical with the idea of
architectures of control, is a common theme in design [38], ranging from manufacturing
engineering (much machinery cannot be switched on until safety guards are in place) to
project management (critical path analysis or Gantt charts to ensure that operations are
performed in the correct order) to safety in consumer products (the long earth pin on UK
electric plugs enters the socket first and removes the guard which otherwise prevents
objects being inserted).
Some would certainly fall into the ‘architectures of control’ category, whether
physical (such as cattle-grids), or a combination of physical and psychological (cone-
shaped disposable cups, discouraging users from leaving them on tables); particularly in
quality management within manufacturing industry, the architectures of control in
mistake-proofing (such as designing parts which can deliberately only be assembled one
way) are in fact, commercially strategic, since the business’s reputation can depend
significantly on maintaining a low error rate in its product assembly. The thinking of
‘design for manufacture and assembly’ promulgators such as Boothroyd and Dewhurst
[e.g. 39] is evident in many of these often very simple mistake-proofing architectures.
Mistake-proofing and forcing functions in medical environments are also
common, both in terms of isolating safety hazards and ensuring procedures are followed.
The challenge of retaining these architectures of control once a patient is in charge of his
or her own treatment (such as taking the correct dose and combination of pills [e.g. 40],
or performing particular exercises) should not be underestimated, and is indeed an area
of very useful current research [41].
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The idea of encouraging/incentivising people to exercise (whether for specific medical
reasons or on more general health grounds) is a recurring theme, both in gentler
‘persuasive technologies’—see ‘Academic precedents: everyday things and persuasive
technology’—and as architectures of control.
Square-Eyes, an electronic children’s shoe insole developed by Gillian Swan at
Brunel University, records how many steps the child takes during a day, and ‘translates’
that into a certain number of minutes of ‘TV time,’ with the information transmitted to a
base station connected to, and controlling, the television [42]. There is no easy way
around it for the child: he or she must exercise in order to obtain the ‘reward,’ and as
Tim Ambler points out [43], even ‘cheating’ by, say, jumping up and down on the spot
rather than walking or running will still be exercise. All in all, an interesting
architecture of control, with possible consequences beyond the child—Brunel Design’s
Paul Turnock suggests that “it will raise awareness among the family of their sedentary
lifestyle and bring about a change in behaviour for the whole family” [44].
On a more whimsical premise, but retaining the theme of showing how
technology is allowing architectures of control to become embedded in design thinking,
is Your Turn, a washing machine from Pep Torres of Spanish creative agency De Buena
Tinta, which cannot be operated by the same person twice in a row, by using biometric
identification. “It’s an invention that has a philosophy behind it and I hope both women
and men will think it's time for the men to do more around the house” [45].
Would this kind of system have been conceivable on a consumer product twenty
years ago? Possibly, but perhaps the widespread use of passwords and identification
systems, and the apparent ease with which they now pervade new technology, has made
it much more realistic to consider incorporating architectures of control into new
products—right from the concept stage.
18 18Summary of examples: emergence of intentions
Reviewing the examples across different sectors, a noticeable tension emerges between
architectures of control with primarily commercial benefit intentions, and primarily
social benefit intentions. For example, it is hard to argue that there was any intended
social benefit in DVD region coding [46], but there was an intended commercial benefit.
On the other hand, breathalyser interlocks for car ignitions would appear to have mainly
social benefit intentions, but depending on which lobby is promoting them (e.g. the
manufacturers of the product), there could well also be intended commercial benefits.
However, since this possibility is inherent in any new technology that is introduced, it
has not been explicitly recognised in the table that follows.
The classification according to strategic intentions is an important point, since
the results are by no means guaranteed. This is partially due to the uncertainty over how
easy it is for an ‘average’ consumer to avoid the restrictions which the architecture of
control imposes, or how much work is required to do so—the ‘work factor’ as Bill
Thompson puts it [47]. It was easy for people to buckle their seatbelts and then sit on
top of them to avoid Lee Iacocca’s Interlock, just as it is easy to walk away from
uncomfortable seating at a bus stop; however, it takes more technical understanding to
defeat the DRM on some music CDs, for example. So long as only a minority of customers
circumvent the restrictions, the intentions may broadly succeed, but when the technical
work-arounds suddenly become widely available and easy for non-technical users to
exploit (e.g. with much peer-to-peer software), then the results can be very different.
The following table attempts to classify the examples so far discussed, whilst the fold-
out diagram inside the front cover also places the examples in the appropriate position in
the commercial-social benefit space, along with further examples from subsequent
sections such as the case studies.
‘Social benefit’ intentions are contentious in a number of cases, since even when
‘the public good’ is advanced as a reason for implementing the architecture of control
(e.g. park benches with central armrests to prevent lying down on them), there is
inherently a social disbenefit for certain people. As will become apparent later with the
‘optimum lifetime product’ case study, the idea of social benefit as an intention is more
complex than it may initially appear.
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Example Notes on ‘work factor’
Commercial
benefit?
Social
benefit?
Strategic intentions
High window sills in classrooms
Urban planning examples
Traffic calming
Skateboarding deterrents
Public seats to discourage
sleeping/long occupation
Seats to discourage long
occupation in cafés, etc.
Insurance company monitoring
technology in cars
Fair use copying prevention
User access systems
Trusted computing
Flexplay self-erasing DVDs
DVD Region coding
Analogue hole prevention
(multiple types)
Cameras which censor certain
images
Child-proof lids and car door
locks
Audi A2 bonnet
Replacement parts lock-in
Safety forcing functions
Seat belt-ignition interlocks
Breathalyser-ignition interlocks
Cattle-grids
Cone-shaped disposable cups
Square-Eyes insole/TV control
Your Turn washing machine
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Difficult for pupil to overcome (e.g. by
standing up)
Various levels of difficulty
Difficult to avoid unless alternative routes
are found
Skateboarders will simply find somewhere
else to use
Users will simply find somewhere else
Customers can patronise another
establishment
Would require technologically astute
tinkering to overcome; alternative
insurance companies
Depends on level of DRM, but with
technical expertise, will be circumvented
Depends on level of control; even
biometrics can be fooled
Currently unclear how difficult it will be
to operate successfully outside the system
Numerous technical hacks possible to
circumvent this
Circumvention methods fairly widely
known
Alternative products available (for now)
Alternative products available, even if
that means using film
Not difficult for an intelligent child to
defeat; the lids can also lock-out those
with arthritis
Alternative products available
Depending on the product, there are ways
round this with varying difficulty
Varying levels of difficulty to defeat, but
little incentive to do so
Easy ways around this
Some ways around this but require extra
technical ability
There was a sheep which learned to roll
across a cattle-grid...
Only a (weak) psychological barrier
operates here
Ingenious children will find a way round
it
Alternative products available
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Contentious
Yes
Contentious
Contentious
No
Yes
No
Contentious
Contentious
No
No
No
Contentious
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
YesThere is an interesting additional facet to the notion of commercial benefit. Whilst the
obvious commercial benefit from many architectures of control comes from either
preventing copies being made (thus—following an assumption of perfect substitution—
increasing sales by one unit for every copy prevented) or forcing consumers to buy
replacement parts (thus also increasing sales), there is also the possibility of a strategic
commercial benefit through shifting the balance of power in the development of future
technology. Andreas Bovens (q.v.) quotes (in relation to DRM in the Japanese mobile
phone industry—see ‘Reactions’), a Copyfight article by Ernest Miller which touches on
this idea:
Bovens comments that:
This idea—in effect, innovation lock-out—is applicable beyond simply the commercial
aims of content providers. Rival technology manufacturers employ similar methods to
prevent their hardware being usable in interaction with rivals’ devices: for example,
Sony’s decision to use its own proprietary memory stick format in many of its products
rather than the more common SmartMedia or SD cards. This, in turn, prevents any new
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“...DRM provides the content industries benefits
that are unrelated to or only loosely related to
stopping content from getting onto filesharing
networks...By insisting on [DRM] the content
industries are in a much better position in
negotiating how technology will be permitted to
develop. If the content industry thinks that a
particular new device is too disruptive, they can
lock it out of using their DRM’d content legally,
something that copyright law would otherwise not
allow” [48].
“In other words, broadcasting companies (and
other content providers) can use DRM as a tool for
protecting their business model by outlawing
devices that allow their content to be used in too
innovative ways—without DRM, the broadcasters’
attempts to influence the technology companies
would have far less effect” [11].22 22
Academic precedents: the democracy of innovation
Eric von Hippel of MIT has charted the phenomenon of user-led innovation, and how this has
benefited both companies and users, in The Sources of Innovation [57], published in 1988, and, most
recently, Democratizing Innovation* [58]. As discussed in the ‘Reactions’ section of this paper, whilst
the trend for users to modify and tinker with their products to improve them or create new functions
does not yet appear to have abated in an age of increased architectures of control, there is reason for
concern—von Hippel notes, with an interesting example, that:
It is not unlikely that future studies by von Hippel or others working in this field will document
ingenious user innovation in spite of architectures of control; the challenge may be a sufficient lure in
itself for some technical users.
*I have retained the US spelling for this title
“Current efforts by manufacturers to build technologies
into the products they sell that restrict the way these
products are used can undercut users’ traditional freedom
to modify what they purchase... Makers of ink-jet
printers... may add technical modifications to their
cartridges to prevent them from functioning if users have
refilled them. This manufacturer strategy can potentially
cut off both refilling by the economically minded and
modifications by user-innovators that might involve
refilling... [such as refilling] cartridges with special inks
not sold by printer manufacturers in order to adapt ink-jet
printing to the printing of very high-quality photographs.
Others have refilled cartridges with food colourings instead
of inks in order to develop techniques for printing images
on cakes” [59].
developments using the technology outside of the company’s control. Where innovation
does occur in this realm, using a company’s products but outside of its own development
teams, reactions range from threats of legal action (e.g. the Sony Aibo robot dog hacks
[49]) to the developments being gratefully taken on board by companies eager to
incorporate customers’ innovations—a strategy developed much further in the work of
MIT’s Eric von Hippel (see below).Reactions
An awareness of architectures of control in products, especially digital technology, has
been growing significantly over the past few years, as the ‘Academic precedents’
vignettes show. Perhaps unsurprisingly, some of the strongest reactions have propagated
in and been disseminated through internet communities, especially those at the
intersection of technology and policy thinking.
The technical community's reactions to architectures of control
‘Hacker’ culture may be commonly associated only with computers (and generally, by
the media, in a negative and incorrect way), but in the correct sense of a culture of
technical exploration, experimentation and the innovative testing of rules and
boundaries, it is as evident in the young child who uses a stick to retrieve a confiscated
football from a high shelf as in Richard Feynman determining how to retrieve secret
documents from locked drawers at Los Alamos [63]. The Norwegian teenager working
out how to get DVDs to play on his GNU/Linux box [e.g. 64] is not too far removed from
the group of engineering students working out how to lift an Austin Seven van onto the
roof of Cambridge’s Senate House [65].
There is no malicious intent: whether the attitude is Eric Raymond’s, that “the
world is full of fascinating problems waiting to be solved” [66] or even Feynman’s
“pleasure of finding things out” [67], much ‘hacking’ is simply the use of ingenuity in
an attempt to understand products and systems more fully—indeed, an attempt to grok,
in Robert Heinlein’s very useful terminology [68]. This fuller understanding can come
through—and make possible—finding ways around the embedded architectures of
control, with the result of freeing or improving information or functions that are being
restricted or are obviously not optimised to the user’s advantage.
Another way of phrasing this might be to say that ‘reverse engineering’ (as
demonised by so many EULAs) is not easily separable from ‘forward engineering’—
almost all engineering projects depend on understanding of prior art to facilitate a new
or improved function. To borrow twice, rather convolutedly, from Isaac Newton: there
are many layers of innovators standing on each other’s shoulders, being supported by
previous ingenuity and in turn supporting future innovators to see shinier pebbles
further along the sea shore.
Specifically, many architectures of control in products (and software) are
intended to remove what Edward Felten calls the ‘freedom to tinker’ [69]: the Audi A2
bonnet (q.v.) is a high-profile example, but even Apple’s deliberate design of the iPod to
23 23make battery replacement by the user a difficult task [e.g. 70] counts here as part of a
trend to move product sovereignty away from the user and into the hands of the
‘experts’.
Whilst individual architectures of control—especially those backed by major
companies, such as trusted computing and various DRM methods—have received public
support from some ‘technical’ commentators, the most vocal reactions from the technical
community are generally very wary of the impact that architectures of control may have
on innovation and freedom. For some, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the
fight against restrictive or repressive architectures of control is framed within a larger
legal and civil rights context—“educat[ing] the press, policymakers and the general
public about civil liberties issues related to technology; and act[ing] as a defender of
those liberties” [71]. The ‘chilling effects’ [72] on innovation and cultural development
caused by challenges to liberties, whether through architectures of control, or
regulation, or both, are part of the debate, especially where ‘invisible’ (or perhaps,
‘opaque’) disciplinary architectures can effectively enforce norms as if they were
regulation; as Lawrence Lessig says (specifically in relation to the architecture of
‘cyberspace,’ but nevertheless pertinent to disciplinary architectures in general):
Equally, there are others for whom the effects of architectures of control on the freedom
to innovate predominate in the debate. User-driven innovation (ranging from the
development of pultrusion machinery highlighted by Eric von Hippel in the 1980s, to
the phenomena of ‘innovation communities’ and ‘democratised innovation’ that he has
more recently formalised [58]) is certainly challenged by the rise of architectures of
control in products and software—for example, Hal Varian’s comment on some mobile
phones which detect (and refuse to operate) if a non-recommended brand of battery is used:
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“We should worry about this. We should worry
about a regime that makes invisible regulation
easier; we should worry about a regime that
makes it easier to regulate. We should worry
about the first because invisibility makes it hard
to resist bad regulation; we should worry about
the second because we don’t yet... have a sense of
the values put at risk by the increasing scope of
efficient regulation” [73].The success of O’Reilly Media’s MAKE magazine [75]—“technology on your
time”—aimed at independent technical enthusiasts and hobbyists from a range of skill
levels, with each issue detailing user modifications to existing products (many of them
computer-based), new developments in engineering and technology, and simple
construction of entirely new projects, indicates that democratised innovation is perhaps
a real field of growth, especially if the irritation level of some architectures of control is
sufficient to drive people to find ingenious ways around them through tinkering. MAKE
has 25,000 subscribers after 4 months, as opposed to O’Reilly’s estimate of 10,000 after a
year [76].
Indeed, Richard Stallman’s foundation of the free software movement—perhaps
the archetypal user-driven innovation community—was, in a sense, a reaction to the
imposition of a contractual architecture of control (the more restrictive Lisp licensing
implemented by Symbolics on MIT’s AI Lab [77]).
It is possible, then, that many in the technical community will relish the
challenges set by increased use of architectures of control, and much good work may
come from this; however, for the non-technical consumer, the challenges may lead to
frustration and exclusion, as will be examined in the next section.
(One might argue that in-built restrictive architectures have actually encouraged
innovation—would there have been so many groups dedicated to unlocking the iPod’s
secrets if the architecture had been entirely open?—but this seems to be analogous to
arguing that war is something to encourage because it forces innovation and
resourcefulness: is there not a better way to achieve the same desirable results?)
Overall, much of the technical community’s (cautious) reaction to architectures of
control can be summed up by Paul Graham’s comments—suitably annotated and with
emphasis added:
25 25
“What about cellphone batteries? There are now
hand pumps that allow you to produce enough
juice to charge your own batteries. Inventors are
experimenting with putting such pumps in your
shoes so you can charge your cellphone by
merely walking around. This would be great for
users, but it is hard to experiment with such
technologies if you can use only certain power
sources in your cellphone” [74].26 26
“Show any hacker a lock and his first thought is
how to pick it. But there is a deeper reason that
hackers are alarmed by measures like copyrights
and patents [or, in this case, architectures of
control]. They see increasingly aggressive
measures to protect “intellectual property” [and
indeed, economic or politically strategic
intentions] as a threat to the intellectual freedom
they need to do their job. And they are right... It
is by poking about inside current technology that
hackers [and engineers, and designers] get ideas
for the next generation” [78].
Consumers’ reactions to architectures of control: DRM
If consumers are aware that their behaviour is being restricted, and the idea is presented
in this way, then negative reactions to technology are likely to arise—to the level of an
increasing frustration, perhaps even resistentialism [79]. Now that she is a consumer
rather than chairman of the RIAA, even Hilary Rosen is apparently dissatisfied with
how Apple’s iPod DRM is restricting her behaviour—“Why am I complaining about
this? Why isn’t everyone?” [80]
Perhaps because of Apple’s phenomenally successful iPod marketing over the
past couple of years, the product (along with iTunes) is rarely out of the news: hence,
consumers’ reactions to Apple’s architectures of control (and DRM in music more
generally) have been widely circulated. It is not unreasonable to assume that this body of
reaction may be taken as indicative of the trends that will become apparent over the next
few years as DRM and other architectures of control with little obvious social benefit
spread to more consumer products.
PC Pro magazine’s widely publicised investigation of the UK’s online music
market in April 2005 revealed significant consumer frustrations—some with the fidelity
of the (usually lossy) downloaded tracks, but many with the product lock-in enforced by
DRM and format-based architectures of control:
“‘What people don’t understand is that when
they buy an iPod or other digital music player,
they’re being tied into a system,’ believes Deputy
Labs Editor, Nick Ross... One PC Pro reader spent27 27
£40 downloading music from an online store only
to find that although his MP3 player played
Windows Media Audio (WMA) files that he
created, it wouldn’t play the copyright-protected
WMA files he’d bought. ‘What was I supposed to
do,’ he said, ‘take them back to the shop? It’s way
too confusing’” [81].
Comments from members of the public in response to BBC News coverage [82] of the PC
Pro story reveal more of the same concerns, along with a tale of a whole (paid-for) music
collection being automatically, irretrievably, locked up due to using Windows’ System
Restore function.
There is praise for the convenience of being able to download one track at a time
as opposed to having to buy whole albums as with a CD, but dissatisfaction with the
level of information provided to consumers: how can fairly technical restrictive
architectures of control be presented in a way that is easy to understand for the average
consumer, whilst not putting him or her off the purchase through negative or
complicated language?
This may well be a marketing problem that companies employing restrictive
architectures will have to consider very carefully: trusted computing can at least be
presented as offering ‘security’ (however vague or even erroneous that may be), but it
may be difficult to maintain the ‘convenience’ theme with DRM’d music or movies so
long as there are less restrictive alternatives available—and especially if those
alternatives are familiar and easy to use, such as CDs. One consumer’s reply to the BBC
story sums this up:
Steve Portigal, a customer research consultant whose work often employs ethnography
and consumer behaviour studies to advise on product strategies, agrees that, because of
consumers’ reactions, restrictive architectures of control may not necessarily offer
companies the economic benefits intended:
“The whole concept is ridiculous. Would you
really buy a CD that you could only play on one
brand of CD player? That you couldn’t play in
the car as well as at home and in your CD
Walkman? A CD that has sound quality
comparable to an old cassette tape at best? No,
no, no!” [82]However, he concedes that there is plenty of opportunity for increased use of
architectures of control, simply because of consumers’ non-technical indifference or lack
of time or motivation to understand the implications of what they are buying:
Once an architecture of control becomes very common, there is the possibility that it is
no longer noticed by consumers, and indeed is never questioned. This idea is, of course,
a mainstay of Orwell’s 1984, and much subsequent science-fiction, and as applied to
certain ideas and taboos, is central to Paul Graham’s classic What You Can’t Say [83].
Nevertheless, in certain societies where products have incorporated restrictive
architectures of control for a number of years, it is worth examining to what extent the
restrictions have become ‘normalised’—Japan is the prime example, since, as Andreas
Bovens notes:
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“Products that surprise us with limitations in what
we get, what we can do, what is expected, etc. will be
met with disappointment, frustration, complaints,
and perhaps abandonment. Companies will need to
think carefully about setting and managing
expectations, although even the best plans can go
wrong once a ‘risk’ enters the zeitgeist” [33].
“It always pays to remember that people are busy,
they aren’t thinking about technology, only a very
very few want to think about it, want to understand
the details and the risks, etc. There’s a minimum
activation energy around an issue such as privacy or
cost-rip-off that is set higher than we’d like to believe,
most of us, and right now, the space under that level
is there for the exploiting” [33].
“[many new] devices are first launched on the home
market and distributed internationally at a later time.
Thus, investigating Japan’s current technological
landscape gives us an outlook on the content
processing devices we might expect to appear in other
markets within a short time frame” [11].Sony’s Librié eBook reader, with extremely restrictive DRM (e.g., books stored are
automatically locked up after two months, thus requiring re-purchase), has not proved
popular on the Japanese market—partially, Bovens suggests, because there are
(currently, at least) alternatives available which don’t feature the same architectures of
control. However, the market for chaku-uta, mobile phone ‘ringtunes’ which are versions
of the original tracks, has grown very quickly, even though they too are subject to
restrictive DRM:
As phones, music/game/video players and PDAs converge, it will be interesting to see
whether a generation of children grows up believing it to be perfectly normal to lose all
the content acquired each time the device is replaced—at an abstract level, will the
mental boundaries of what property is change? (This idea will be mentioned again in the
‘Some implications of architectures of control’ section).
Consumers’ reactions to architectures of control: external control
Some of the most extreme consumer reactions may be expected to occur where the
architectures of control in products explicitly remove control from the user and pass it to
an outside party.
One method of achieving this may be products which only continue to function
if mandated software updates are automatically downloaded, such as the TiVo—this
becomes contentious when the software update explicitly changes the product’s
functions from the feature set with which it was originally purchased, with commercial
benefit intentions.
With the TiVo, an automatic update in autumn 2004 “puts restrictions on how
long your DVR [digital video recorder] can save certain kinds of shows—so far, just pay-
per-view and video-on-demand programs” [85]. However infrequent such function-
limiting updates might be, the feature set of the product has been changed, and any
attempt to avoid this change (e.g. by unplugging the TiVo from the telephone line to
prevent the update occurring) will cause the product to cease functioning entirely, thus
removing all the features purchased. Whatever dissatisfaction consumers may have with
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“heavily DRMed chaku-uta... downloads break all
records; the same is true for mobile games: they
are DRMed but nobody seems to care, even if it
means they’ll have to buy them again when they
switch to another cell phone [2.6 years on
average]” [84].this, there are alternatives, such as other personal digital video recorders—although
none with quite the TiVo’s combination of attributes—or, for more technically inclined
consumers, building a custom “home media convergence box” using software such as
the MythTV suite [86].
The case of external control which is arguably most likely to cause a widespread
consumer reaction, outside of technical users, is the External Vehicle Speed Control
system—with intended social benefits—proposed by Oliver Carsten at the University of
Leeds’ Institute for Transport Studies. This is perhaps one of the most clear-cut examples
of a disciplinary architecture of control:
Carsten’s own survey, involving both members of the public and representatives from
the police, motoring and motorcycling organisations and environmental groups,
concedes that:
There are also many possible implications and concerns relevant to this type of system,
into which there is insufficient scope to go here, ranging from attribution of accident
liability, to the level of driver control (to what extent can he/she disable the system?), to
implementing reliable fail-safes in the system, to the costs of installing and operating the
hundreds of thousands of roadside ‘beacons’ that Carsten proposes (an alternative being
a GPS-based architecture).
Nevertheless, the EVSC system as proposed by the final (July 2000) Carsten
report to the Department of the Environment, Transport & Regions suggests “mandatory
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“An on-board vehicle speed limiting mechanism
may be interfaced to data supplied by roadside
infrastructure to provide a method of enacting
dynamic local road speed limits to:
—reduce excess speed
—control speeds around an accident site or
environmental hazards
—manipulate traffic flows” [87].
“[There is] a general resistance to the concept of
speed control... it was suggested that a system
such as speed control that takes control away from
the driver could lead to the loss in [sic.] skills in
‘reading the road’” [87].usage” in 2019. The report—interestingly—includes a disclaimer to the effect that:
As of 2005, “no policy decision has been made on whether or not to move ahead with
the implementation of such a system for the vehicles on Britain’s roads” [89], but
whether or not that ‘public support’ is eventually forthcoming, the most vocal reaction
so far has been entirely opposed to the system, with the 2001 International
Motorcyclists’ Public Policy Conference at Mulhouse declaring its opposition to the
proposals and creating a petition including the line, “We note with extreme concern the
tendency of governments to impose ever more intrusive and restrictive regulations upon
the citizen” [90].
Regardless of the safety benefits of speed control (and the public, if surveyed,
would possibly approve of the speed control on buses, coaches and trucks), it is surely
the external part which will cause the most consternation if the EVSC plans do proceed
further. Architectures of control which fall into this category may be the hardest of all
for consumers to accept; it is taking the concept of the ‘nanny state’ to a limit where the
nursery is teetering on the brink of rebellion.
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“EVSC has the potential to bring about a very
considerable accident reduction, but that potential
can only be realised, if in the end there is public
support for the introduction of EVSC” [88].32 32
Case study: printer cartridges
Printer cartridges are a consumer product category with a variety of architectures of control
exhibiting characteristics discussed in this paper. Aside from the obvious economic lock-in (the
razor blade model), there are some specific implementations that are worth detailing further (all are
assumed to have commercial benefit and little social benefit; see the fold-out diagram for their
positioning):
Example Details
Canon (Japan) printers detect
whether or not genuine Canon
replacement cartridges are
used (the ‘handshake’), and
refuse to print if a non-Canon
cartridge (often cheaper) is
detected.
Lexmark laser printers
perform a handshake with
cartridges and will not operate
with cartridges identified as
non-Lexmark.
Static Control Components
replicated handshake to enable
replacement cartridges to work
with Lexmark printers [99].
Some Hewlett-Packard printers
report that printer cartridges
need replacement and also
shut down the cartridges at a
predetermined date regardless
of whether they are empty—
even if have never been used.
Some manufacturers which
produce printers and
cartridges under different
brands with different pricing
levels allegedly permit the
cheaper brand’s cartridges to
function, but make sure the
print quality is poor to
discourage consumers from
further purchases.
25
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The Japanese Fair Trade Commission is
investigating. Canon has previously lost a
case over whether external companies
recycling (refilling) Canon brand cartridges
infringes Canon's intellectual property rights
[98].
Lexmark sued SCC under the DMCA; the
sale of the SCC handshake chips was banned
but the ban was lifted on appeal. “The
DMCA was not intended to create
aftermarket electronic monopolies...[this] is a
major victory for the consuming public and
American companies” (Ed Swartz, SCC chief
executive) [100].
The argument could be made that this is to
protect the consumer from a cartridge that
no longer functions properly due to ink
becoming denatured or the print head
blocked, but this is a rather weak benefit for
the consumer. A Georgia woman is currently
suing Hewlett-Packard over this issue, with
the suit seeking class-action status [101]
“I have a Dell AIO 920... which is a rebadged
Lexmark 1150. Local PC store does Lexmark
cartridges for the 1150 that fit the Dell—
almost. The cartridge is identical apart from
the top cover—it’s a recessed ‘U’ shape on
the Dell cartridge, but has a raised diagonal
plastic tab on the Lexmark—upshot is, you
load it in, close the lid, and all your printing
is badly misaligned (colour against black).
No way of adjusting it to fit with the
supplied software as it is so far out of
alignment” [102].
Refilled cartridges
retaining ‘genuine
Canon cartridge’
chip possible; Self-
refilling is also
possible.
Alternative laser
printers available
which do not have a
handshake function.
Providing consumers
know to avoid
Hewlett-Packard
printers with the
expiration function,
they can choose
alternatives.
“Solution? Snap off
the diagonal tab-
works a treat!” [102]
However, if this had
been a software issue
rather than a simple
physical one, there
may not be such an
easy work-around.
*This is an example of a company producing a work-around for an architecture of control rather than an
architecture of control itself, so has not been included on the numbered list or the fold-out diagram
Notes on
‘work factor’Some implications of architectures of control
How will increased use of architectures of control in the design of products change the
way we live? Depending on how pervasive they are, and how feasible the alternatives
are, there is the possible emergence of two tiers of technology consumers—those who
embrace products with architectures of control, with the (real or imagined) benefits that
may offer them (for example, exclusive content, the ‘security’ of trusted computing, or
simply network effects)—and those ‘excluded consumers’ who either stick to using
older technology free of control, or (depending on legality) buy new, probably premium-
priced, ‘professional’ equipment which is similarly free of control. It may become a
vanity for the technical connoisseur—similarly to the way that valve amplifiers or the
ash frame of the Morgan sports-car are today revered.
But where would this leave consumers who actually depend on the freedoms that
are taken away by many architectures of control, through disability, for financial reasons
or simply for reasons of social good? Will a ‘technology underclass’ become apparent?
Will screen-reader software for the partially sighted work in a world of tightly restricted
eBooks? Precedents set by existing DRM would suggest significant problems in this
area—to the extent that the UK’s Royal National Institute for the Blind is currently
compiling a report on “how widely used DRM systems block access by blind or partially
sighted people” [91]. Will sharing books be possible with Sony Librié eBooks that expire
after a couple of months? How will the PCs currently being donated for educational use
to developing countries worldwide be affected when everyone else is using ‘trusted
computing’? How will a buyer of a used Audi A2 fifteen years from now cope with the
bonnet constraint? And, as raised earlier, how will DRM and ‘unpublishing’ affect
archiving and accountability?
One conclusion which it is possible to draw from many of the architectures of
control examined so far is that the relationship between the consumer and his or her
‘products’ (and the content used on them) is gradually changing. Whereas buying an LP
gave the consumer a permanent, physical copy of that music, which could be played on a
variety of devices, and resold or lent or destroyed or recorded onto tape at will (whether
or not each of those activities was legal), buying music or other content now is
effectively buying a very limited licence to use it which is enforced by the architectures
of control in both the content and the device on which it is used.
Extending this to some of the other architectures of control, it becomes a
possibility that consumers are no longer buying products, but effectively licensing the
33 33functions those products provide [92]. This idea will be developed further in ‘Case study:
‘optimum lifetime products’’ but it is worth noting here Bill Thompson’s tentative
suggestion [47] that perhaps this is part of a wider trend of society moving away (or
being moved away) from the individual sovereignty property régime of the last few
hundred years—increasingly, control of the technology will be in the hands of the
‘experts.’
What do designers themselves think the implications of architectures of control
might be? Do they see them as a useful set of additional tools for building into future
products?
Chris Weightman, an industrial designer at London consultancy Tangerine,
believes that outside of the companies that have gone strategically (and perhaps
philosophically) down the DRM and restriction route, designers will generally tend to
focus on making the product experience more attractive to the user, with easier
interactions a goal of many briefs. This tends to work against many architectures of
control: indeed, there may well be a commercial advantage to being ‘second’ in the
market (a ‘me-too’ product) but offering a simpler, more open product:
All this assumes that there is still the legal freedom to pursue strategies outside of using
architectures of control, which in certain sectors, may not be the case. If External Vehicle
Speed Control (q.v.) becomes mandatory on new cars, for example, there is no legal
market position for a company producing vehicles without EVSC (although one might
suggest a limited market for a company which reconditions and refurbishes pre-EVSC
cars to a very high standard—giving the ‘new car’ experience, complete with
warranties, but on vehicles which are legally deemed to be ‘old’).
A parallel development may be the use of architectures of control to empower the
consumer in some way—an example being the ‘knee defender’ now available for airline
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“The only distinctive selling point of some
companies’ products—particularly in the
portable music player market—is that they allow
the user to get round the restrictive architecture
of the market leaders. If design can build on that
distinctiveness by making the product appealing
in other ways as well, then second place could
well become first place” [93].passengers to set the angle which the passenger in front can recline his or her seat [94].
Here, the consumer is applying an architecture of control, perhaps in an arbitrary way,
but it sets the scene for a plethora of innovation, possibly from small companies, to
impose control on the surrounding environment or overcome architectures of control
that have been built into that environment by others. It may spiral into a cycle of
competing architectures and methods of defeating them—speed cameras, then the slave-
flash for car number plates which would defeat the speed cameras [95], and so on.
Indeed, the opportunity may be there for innovative small companies to exploit
the concern or paranoia which has led to the imposition of the architectures of control in
the first place. It may be an entrepreneur whose breathalyser interlock persuades
legislators to regulate on this issue, for instance.
Or, by extension, a small company which offers large corporate customers a way
(real or perceived) to reinforce the superiority of their product (e.g. music, films,
consumer electronics and even cosmetics) over illegal copies, could be extremely
successful. Hamish Thain, a designer at the innovative packaging firm Burgopak [96,
97], makes the point that by offering third parties a distinctive, patented packaging
system, those third parties can enhance and protect the value of their own products
when compared to unauthorised copies or ‘knock-offs.’ Targeting clients (including
Microsoft, Sony and numerous record companies) who are at the forefront of the
intellectual property protection debate leverages—and satisfies—that corporate
concern, whilst at the same time enabling a smaller innovator to succeed. Whilst this
may not be Burgopak’s explicit strategy—and is, of course, not an architecture of control
in itself—it demonstrates the fluidity of a situation where the motivations that lead to
architectures of control can be exploited.
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Case study: ‘optimum lifetime products’
Despite consumer frustration when they break,
many products are designed and built to last far
longer than might be considered
‘environmentally optimum.’ Simply put, if
technology in a certain field is advancing at a
rate such that newer products use less energy
(in manufacture and use) than old ones (which
may also be using increasingly more energy due
to wear and tear), there will come a point where
comparatively, it is more environmentally
beneficial to replace older products (and recycle
them to recover as much embodied energy as
possible) with new ones [103].
Of course, encouraging consumers to
replace their products with new ones is also the
goal of many companies and their design and
marketing teams, for purely commercial
reasons. But what if these interests were to be
dovetailed—the social benefit intentions of an
environmentally optimum lifetime for a
product, and the commercial benefit intentions
of managed replacement times?
An optimum lifetime product could
‘expire’ at the point when its optimum lifetime
is reached (based on actual usage rather than
averages for the sector, so as not to antagonise
light users)—thus minimising the
environmental damage caused. The architecture
of control would prevent further usage.
Would consumers put up with this? David
Harrison, who has worked extensively on
technology for sustainable product design,
including active disassembly and conductive
lithography, comments that, “having a machine
that decided when its lifetime was up, though
was capable of working well, could be
extremely frustrating” [104]. Nevertheless,
when the idea is considered in the light of the
end-of-life take-back legislation for cars and
other products (e.g. the Waste Electrical and
Electronic Equipment directive [105]), a more
>
coherent scheme emerges: products which have
a pre-determined lifetime (based on usage) and
once that lifetime is up, they are returned to the
manufacturer (perhaps the products even signal
to the manufacturer that they are reaching
expiry). The product could then be replaced, or
a different model chosen, maybe depending on
a licence agreement the purchaser has with the
manufacturer or supplier. In effect, the
consumer is simply renting the functions the
product provides.
A system such as this would have to offer
the consumer sufficient obvious benefits to be
appealing enough to sign up to a rental-style
agreement in the first instance. Whilst products
which are always in an optimum state of
efficiency would save some energy costs, this is
unlikely to provide sufficient motivation.
However, if the product’s original warranty
were to be extended to cover the entire lifetime
of the product until it expired, then this might
be incentive enough—along with the promise
of a shiny new replacement every few years.
The consumer would be renting the functions
required, with no worries about servicing or
maintenance; the manufacturer or retailer
would have guaranteed income and a
guaranteed outlet for its future products, plus
full control of recovering (and recycling,
cannibalising—or perhaps reconditioning?) the
expired products (which presumably would
have restrictions applied on issues such as
customer modification, disassembly or
customisation).
As has been touched upon earlier, would a
much more common use of this kind of
architecture of control, in conjunction with the
rental model, lead to a noticeable change in
consumers’ attitudes to property? Would no
longer owning much of the technology used in
everyday life (cars, computers, white goods,37 37
and so on) have a psychological impact on consumers’ attitudes to those products? There are so many
possibilities, including users deliberately accelerating the expiry of their products to hasten the
arrival of a brand-new replacement, that a much deeper investigation of the idea is worthy of
consideration.
Equally deserving of consideration, of course, is to what extent the social benefit of better
environmental performance would be negated by the welfare issue of locking poorer consumers into
expensive product replacement cycles which do not individually benefit them. A family whose
washing machine automatically expires even though it still worked perfectly, and who are unable to
afford to keep paying the licence, may be better served by a functioning, inefficient machine than by
the larger environmental benefit of a non-functioning machine.
There are some much less complex architectures of control in products which could also
achieve social benefits in terms of lessening environmental damage. Office lighting could
automatically switch off if no-one was in the room, or if the level of sunlight were detected to be
above a certain threshold. A car throttle could prevent excessive or unnecessary revving.
Alternatives which lessen the ‘control’ aspect could include devices which simply warn users about
how they are being operated, for example a refrigerator with an alarm which sounds if the door is
not closed properly, or built-in electricity meters on household plugs. Even rubbish bins could be
made smaller to make consumers more aware of how much they are throwing away.
>
Example Notes on ‘work factor’
Commercial
benefit?
Social
benefit?
Strategic intentions
Expiry of products at optimum
lifetime (as part of ‘rental’
scheme)
Lighting automatically
switching off
Car throttle preventing
excessive revving
28
29
30
Alternatives would be available outside of
the rental scheme, and illicit hacks would
undoubtedly arise to delay expiry.
An over-ride may be built in.
Unless monitored, would probably be
fairly easy to circumvent.
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
YesConclusion
This has been a rapid look at product design in some diverse areas, with the
architectures of control perhaps, initially, not obviously sharing many characteristics.
However, a picture does emerge from the glimpses of fields ranging from motoring to the
music industry, exercise promotion to the environment.
Control of the public’s behaviour—whilst nothing new—now has the potential
to be much more widespread, through the use of design and technology to change the
relationship between consumers and products. Whether for purely commercial benefit or
‘the greater good,’ whether by companies or by governments, architectures of control
have the power to affect our lives. The phenomenon deserves recognition.
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